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Multinational Clients: 
A Source Of Competitive Advantage 
For Multinational Audit Firms 





This research evaluates the competitive advantages of the Big 6 audit firms in selected foreign 
markets, namely in Malaysia, Hong Kong, and the United Kingdom. In particular, the current study 
investigates audit pricing for multinational clients headquartered in the above regions.  The 
analyses consider the degree of multinationality of the client and the locations of multinational 
clients’ operations in order to gain insight into the determination of audit fees and audit firms’ 
competitive advantages. The results indicate that audit fee premiums increase as the level of 
multinationality of the client increases in the Malaysian market, but not in the Hong Kong or UK 
markets. Also, in Malaysia, the magnitude of the Big 6 audit fee premium increases for clients with 
subsidiaries in developed countries.  However, in Hong Kong and the United Kingdom, the location 
of client subsidiaries in developed countries does not provide additional competitive advantages for 





his research extends a recent study by Rose (1999) by evaluating the competitive advantages of the 
Big 6 audit firms
1
 in selected foreign markets, namely in Malaysia, Hong Kong, and the United 
Kingdom.  The choice of geographic areas allows for a comparison of the multinational client market 
in regions with varying levels of economic development.
 2
  In particular, the current study investigates audit pricing 
for multinational clients headquartered in the above regions.  The analyses consider the degree of multinationality of 
the client and the locations of multinational clients‟ operations in order to gain insight into the determination of audit 
fees and audit firms‟ competitive advantages.  
 
A conclusion of the Rose (1999) study states that the Big 6 accounting firms have a competitive advantage in 
the multinational client segment of the Malaysian market.  The multinational clients appear to recognize, value, and 
pay for the higher quality provided by the Big 6 firms.  But are all multinational clients the same?  What 
characteristics of the multinational clients drive the above results?  Does the “level” of multinationality of the client 
have an effect on the client‟s demand for audit services provided by different auditors?  Theory suggests that higher 
Big 6 fee premiums will be assessed to “more” multinational clients, or clients with operations in various developed 
countries (as compared to ones with operations in developing countries).  The investors associated with multinational 
clients having operations in developed countries should have a higher demand for audit services with international 
reputations.  This research tests for Big 6 audit firm advantages in the multinational client segment.   
 
 It is important to examine these issues because the results provide additional information concerning the 
pricing strategies and demand for audit services in international markets.  A demand for high audit quality in a 
                                                          
1 Currently, only four of the largest public accounting firms remain (referred to as the Big 4).  These include Deloitte & Touche, KPMG, 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, and Ernst & Young.  This study was conducted before the merger of PriceWaterhouse and Coopers & Lybrand, and 
before the demise of Arthur Andersen. These firms made up the Big 6 referred to in this study.  
2 According to the World Bank, “the use of the term „country‟ does not imply political independence but may refer to any territory whose 
authorities present for it separate social and economic statistics” (World Bank 1995, p. viii).  A similar application of this term is used in this study. 
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developing market may be a signal of economic development in the region and the advancement of capital markets.  
The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) provide assistance in developing regions to spur 
economic growth.  It may be possible to promote growth by encouraging firms in developing countries to pursue 
multinational expansion and to establish subsidiaries in more developed regions.  If firms face higher demand for 
quality audit services, then financial reporting will be improved and the costs of information to investors will decline.  
Such actions could assist developing countries in achieving much desired economic growth.  The Big 6/4 audit firms 
may have an opportunity to provide additional assurance that financial information is of high quality.   
 
 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  The next section presents a brief discussion of the three 
countries that are examined in the study.  The following section includes theory development and introduces the 
research questions.  The next section describes the research methodology used in this study and the results.  The final 
section presents the conclusions and limitations of the study. 
 
BRIEF DISCUSSION OF REGIONS 
 
The choice of geographic regions examined in this study was driven to a large extent by the disclosure 
requirements for audit fees in the various locations.  Being members and former members of the British 
Commonwealth, the three countries chosen for investigation have very similar accounting and auditing environments 
(Simon et al. 1992, Marston 1986, 34).  A common requirement of all three countries is the disclosure of audit fees in 
the financial statements.  Similar accounting and auditing environments in these regions allow for more meaningful 
comparisons of audit fee determinants than would be possible in countries with vastly different accounting histories.   
 
One developing and two developed countries are included in the study.  Malaysia is classified as a 
developing country, and Hong Kong and the United Kingdom are developed economies.  The World Bank uses the 
level of gross national product (GNP) per capita as the criterion for classifying economies.  The term “developing 
country” is used for countries that fall into the low and middle income categories.  The World Bank (1996) classifies 
Malaysia as an upper middle income economy.  Previous audit fee studies have found differing results for Malaysia 
compared to more developed nations.  Simon et al. (1992) did not find a Big 6 audit fee premium, suggesting that 
firms and the securities market in Malaysia do not place a high value on audit quality.  Other research (Rose 1999) 
finds that a Big 6 audit fee premium does exist in Malaysia, but only for the multinational client segment of the 
market.   
 
Two developed countries are also examined: Hong Kong and the United Kingdom.  Prior research has found 
a Big 6 fee premium in each of these countries.  On July 1, 1997, Hong Kong ceased to be a British territory and 
became a Special Administrative Region of the People‟s Republic of China.  Hong Kong will be responsible for its 
own administration (including its own laws) for the next 50 years.  Changes are taking place rapidly in this region.  
For example, Hong Kong is replacing many of the British laws with Hong Kong ordinances (Ernst and Young 1990).  
The current study (using 1996 data) offers an opportunity to benchmark audit fee determinants in Hong Kong prior to 
its transition from British to Chinese rule.   
 
The UK has a very long accounting and auditing tradition and is an example of a highly industrialized G-7 
country.
3
  It is the only G-7 country for which audit fees are required disclosures (for the year of the study).  The study 
by Rose (1999) calls for additional research of audit fees and multinationality for countries outside of the Asian 
region.  The UK differs from Hong Kong in terms of political, cultural, and geographic aspects.  The generalizability 
of the results to other developed countries is enhanced through the inclusion of both Hong Kong and the UK in the 
analyses made in this study. 
 
Theory and Hypotheses Development 
 
The issue of audit pricing, for both US and foreign audits, has received considerable attention in accounting 
literature.  Simunic (1980) and other authors (e.g., Simon et al. 1992, Chung and Lindsay 1988, Palmrose 1986, Firth 
1985, Simon 1985, Francis 1984) developed models for the determinants of audit fees in the US and foreign markets 
                                                          
3 The G-7 group includes the following countries: UK, USA, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, and Japan. 
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with considerable success.  Special consideration has been devoted to examining the audit fees charged by the largest 
US audit firms, referred to in prior studies as the Big 8, Big 6, Big 6, and now Big 4 firms.  Evidence suggests that the 
Big 4 firms charge fee premiums
4
 in the US market and in many foreign markets (see e.g., Rose 1999, Simon et al. 
1992, Francis and Simon 1987, Palmrose 1986, Francis 1984).   
 
 A recent study by Rose (1999) examined the determinants of audit fees, the role of multinational enterprises 
in audit pricing, and large audit firm fee premiums in two foreign markets, Hong Kong and Malaysia.  Successful 
foreign direct investment by the Big 6 firms stems from their ability to sustain a competitive advantage in these 
markets.  Based on the theory of the multinational enterprise (MNE), the Rose study explained why the large 
accounting firms can charge fee premiums in certain foreign markets.  However, the study documented that Malaysia 
did not offer the appropriate location conditions to allow the Big 6 firms to charge fee premiums to all clients.  
Developing countries, like Malaysia, pose certain location “disadvantages” that limit the ability of Big 6 firms to 
realize their competitive advantages to the full extent.  The study further found that Big 6 firms were able to realize 
their competitive advantages in the multinational client segment of the Malaysian market.  MNE clients must have 
unique characteristics that allow Big 6 firms to charge fee premiums.  For example, MNE clients have many more 
international investors that would value the reputation and audit quality provided by the Big 6 firms.  Also, through its 
subsidiaries, an MNE client operates in many different locations in the world and, therefore, is affected by the 
environments of many countries.   
 Indeed, Caves (1996, 94) writes “…MNEs might take part in different strategic groups than their national 
competitors” and “…MNEs domiciled in different source countries might compromise different strategic groups.”  
Moreover, it has been documented in many studies that MNE firms are more profitable than their domestic 
competitors, after controlling for industry, firm size and financial structure (see e.g., Benvignati 1987, Shapiro 1980).  
For example, Shapiro (1980) investigated the profitability of MNE and domestic firms in Canada.  US subsidiaries 
were found to be more profitable than the Canadian companies.  The uniqueness of the MNE firms is especially 
evident when the MNEs first enter a foreign market.  They bring with them proprietary assets, and they conduct 
business in unfamiliar ways.  The domestic firms try to imitate the foreign entrant‟s competitive advantages.  As the 
MNE ages, its market conduct becomes less differentiated form domestic competitors.  This may provide one reason 
why Rose (1999) documented Big 6 fee premiums only for the multinational client segment in Malaysia and for both 
multinational and domestic clients in Hong Kong.  MNE clients in Malaysia and Hong Kong are most likely at 
different stages of development, with Malaysian MNEs being “newer” to the market than Hong Kong MNE firms.   
 When Big 6 firms engage in foreign direct investment, they can benefit from internalization advantages (cost 
and demand synergies) by offering audit services to MNE clients that operate in many locations.  Since a 
multinational client is mobile and has operations in several different countries, a multinational audit firm such as a Big 
6 firm may actually reduce transaction costs for the client (Casson 1982).  Rather than having to procure different 
auditors in all of the countries in which the MNE client operates, the client may experience cost savings by employing 
only one accounting firm that replicates its activities across regions.  Big 6 firms are aware that they reduce total 
transaction costs for their multinational clients, and can increase their fees accordingly (as compared to domestic 
clients).  MNE clients should also have a higher demand for Big 6 audits because their international investors should 
place a high value on the Big 6 reputations and superior audit quality.  For the reasons described above, a higher fee 
premium is expected for multinational clients than for domestic clients in both developed and developing countries.  
This leads to the initial hypotheses. 
 
Hypothesis 1) In Malaysia, a developing country, Big 6 audit firms will charge greater fee premiums to 
multinational clients than to domestic clients. 
Hypothesis 2) In developed countries (Hong Kong and the United Kingdom), Big 6 audit firms will charge greater 
fee premiums to multinational clients than to domestic clients. 
 
                                                          
4 Prior audit fee literature established a specific definition for the phrase “fee premium” (see e.g., Simon et al. 1992, Palmrose 1986, Simunic 1980). 
These studies have shown that the Big 6/4 auditors are able to charge higher fees than non-Big 6 auditors for audits of the same size, complexity, 
and risk (i.e., the Big 6 charge a “fee premium”). 
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 It should be noted that MNE clients are not associated with more “audit failures” than domestic firms.5  A 
study by Hermanson et al. (1996) investigated the association of multinational risk factors with audit failures.  The 
multinational risk factors examined in the study included foreign currency issues, international political risks, 
international economic risks, greater information asymmetry, and greater complexity.  The authors did not find that 
the multinational risk factors contributed to failures.  Rather, they noted that factors common to multinational and 
domestic enterprises - adverse economic conditions, litigation, and intra-company problems - were responsible for the 
failures of these companies.  Therefore, the multinationality level of clients is not simply a surrogate for increased 
audit failure risk. 
 
 Further analysis of competitive advantages for Big 6 firms can be performed by distinguishing between the 
subsidiaries of the MNE clients.  Not all MNE clients may provide the same level of competitive advantage for the 
Big 6 firms.  Location advantages and disadvantages may play a role in the differential pricing of the Big 6 firms.  Big 
6 firms may charge different prices for its MNE clients, depending on the locations of the client‟s foreign operations.  
Haskins and Williams (1988) addressed a similar question.  Their study investigated whether the Big 8 firms applied 
consistent pricing strategies across five countries (Australia, New Zealand, Ireland, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States).  The findings supported similar pricing strategies for four of the five countries (Ireland was the 
exception).  The authors did not attempt to explain why pricing strategies were different for Ireland, but they did cite a 
need for future research into audit fee pricing in countries with dissimilar accounting and auditing environments. 
 
 This study addresses the pricing strategies of Big 6 firms for MNE clients with subsidiaries in developing 
versus developed countries.  For clients located in developing countries (Malaysia), MNEs with subsidiaries in 
developed countries should be charged higher audit fees by Big 6 firms than MNEs with subsidiaries in developing 
countries because higher audit quality should be demanded by these MNEs.  It is likely that the investors in these 
MNE clients will come from developed countries where higher audit quality is demanded and the reputations of the 
Big 6 audit firms are more likely to be valued.  Further, stricter reporting requirements for the subsidiaries in 
developed countries will increase the securities market‟s demand for quality, which will result in higher fees. 
 
 In addition, Big 6 firms may also charge higher fees for MNEs from developing countries with many 
developed country subsidiaries because of higher risk exposure.  Big 6 auditors face higher risk exposure when the 
subsidiaries of MNE clients are located in developed countries.  If an auditor experiences an audit failure for an MNE 
client with developed-country subsidiaries, that auditor may impair its reputation in the developed countries where the 
subsidiaries operate.  Alternatively, if the MNE subsidiaries are located in developing countries, the chance of a loss 
to reputation due to audit failure will be lower because this information is less likely to reach other significant clients.  
 
 The risk factors introduced by the existence of subsidiaries in developed countries should not affect non-Big 
6 auditors to the same extent as Big 6 auditors.  The magnitude of possible loss due to damaged reputation would be 
higher for Big 6 auditors than for smaller local firms because Big 6 auditors are multinational enterprises with 
international reputations.  A damaged reputation would be more difficult to reverse for these auditors.   
 
 In summary, the location disadvantages faced by Big 6 accounting firms operating in developing countries 
may be diminished to some extent when the client has subsidiaries in developed countries.  The above discussion 
leads to the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3) In Malaysia, a developing country, a Big 6 audit firm fee premium will be of greater magnitude for 
MNE clients with subsidiaries in developed countries than for MNE clients with subsidiaries in 
developing countries.  
 
 Similar arguments can be made concerning the subsidiaries of MNE clients located in developed countries.  
A higher audit fee premium should be charged for MNEs with subsidiaries in developed countries than for MNEs with 
subsidiaries in developing countries.  Again, fees may increase because of added reputation risk exposure (for the Big 
6 audit firm) associated with many developed country subsidiaries.  The arguments for increased disclosure 
                                                          
5 An “audit failure” occurs when an unmodified audit opinion is issued shortly before a client declares bankruptcy.  
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requirements and the demand for audit quality also apply to developed country MNEs, but to a somewhat lesser 
extent.  MNEs in developed countries with subsidiaries in developing countries should be charged the same (or 
potentially lower) audit fees by the Big 6 firms than MNEs with subsidiaries in developed countries.  An MNE located 
in a developed country already demands high audit quality.  It is unlikely that the investors associated with the 
subsidiaries in developing countries would drive the demand for audit quality down.  However, the scope of audits for 
MNEs with developing country subsidiaries should not be as large because developing countries have less rigorous 
disclosure requirements.  Collectively, the above arguments lead to the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 4) In developed countries (Hong Kong and the United Kingdom), a Big 6 audit firm fee premium will 
be of greater magnitude for MNE clients with subsidiaries in developed countries than for MNE 




Several variations of the audit fee model have been developed in the literature (see e.g., Chung and Lindsay 
1988, Francis and Simon 1987, Francis and Stokes 1986, Palmrose 1986, Firth 1985, Simon 1985, Simunic 1980).  
The base model used in this study includes variables that have been consistent determinants of audit fees in prior 
studies.  The base model shown below tests for the existence of an overall audit fee premium in the three countries, 
Malaysia, Hong Kong, and the United Kingdom.  For all testing, each country‟s data is analyzed independently to 
prevent confounding the results.  Variables relevant to each hypothesis are added to the base model for testing, using 
ordinary least squares regression. 
Base Model 
 
LnAUDIT FEES = b0 + b1 LnASSETS  + b2 SUBS + b3 INVREC + b4 LOSS + b5 DEBT + b6 OPINION + b7 
MNE + b8 AUDITOR + e 
 
Table 1 provides a summary of the variables, their constructs, and a description of what each variable 
represents (for further discussion and justification of each variable, see prior audit fee studies, e.g., Rose 1999, Simon 
et al. 1992, Simunic 1980).  The table also shows the predicted effect of each independent variable on the dependent 
variable, AUDIT FEES.  The measures used to capture multinationality of the audit client deserve further description.  
Two different measures are used for this variable to confirm the robustness of the results.
6
   
 
The degree of multinationality of the audit client can be captured in numerous ways.  First, the MNE variable 
is calculated by dividing the number of foreign subsidiaries by the total number of subsidiaries of the client.  This 
measure is a reasonable proxy for the extent of foreign operations.   Previous studies have used such a variable to 
control for audit complexity (e.g., Chung and Lindsay 1988, Francis and Simon 1987, Simunic 1980).  However, this 
variable measures more specific characteristics of the multinational client than simply complexity of operations.  The 
variable can proxy for the degree of risk associated with international reputation loss for auditor firms and can also 
proxy for the demand by foreign investors for audit quality.  Second, the degree of multinationality is measured by the 
ratio of foreign sales to total sales (see e.g., Rose 1999, Sundaram and Black 1992, Daniels and Bracker 1989, 
Geringer et al. 1989).  This measure captures the magnitude of foreign sales, either through foreign direct investment 
or through export.  While both measures are valid proxies for multinationality, each measure delivers a unique 
perspective on the degree of internationalization of the audit client.  A positive relationship with audit fees is expected 







                                                          
6 Each model is run two times (one time for each of the two MNE variables). 







 The AUDITOR variable in the base model is a dummy variable that distinguishes between Big 6 and non-Big 
6 auditors.  A positive and significant result for the AUDITOR variable would signify that Big 6 firms have a 
competitive advantage over non-Big 6 firms and are able to charge higher fees (i.e., fee premiums) than non-Big 6 
auditors for audits of similar scope, complexity, and risk.  Based on prior research, an overall Big 6 fee premium is 
expected in the developed countries, Hong Kong and the United Kingdom, and no overall premium is expected for the 
developing country, Malaysia. 
 The interaction between the AUDITOR variable and the MNE variable is added to the base model to test 
Hypotheses 1 and 2 (see Model 1).  These hypotheses predict that Big 6 firms have a competitive advantage in the 
multinational client segment of the audit market in both developed and developing regions.  A positive and significant 
coefficient on the interaction variable would indicate that Big 6 firms charge higher fee premiums for multinational 
clients than non-Big 6 firms.
7
   
Model 1 
 
LnAUDIT FEES = b0 + b1 LnASSETS  + b2 SUBS + b3 INVREC + b4 LOSS + b5 DEBT + b6 OPINION + b7 




                                                          
7 In addition, an incremental R2 test is performed to test the contribution of the interaction term to the explanatory power of the model. 
Label Construction Description Predicted Effect
 on Audit Fees as
Variable Increases
Dependent Variable:
   LnAUDIT FEES Natural log of audit fees of the auditited client* Audit fees for year of audit
Independent Variables: Variable controls for:
   LnASSETS Natural log of total assets of the auditited client* Client size +
   SUBS Total number of subsidiaries of the auditied client Audit complexity +
   that are at least 50% owned
   INVREC Sum of audited client's inventories and receivables Audit complexity and risk +
      divided by client's total assets
   LOSS 1 if net income was negative for any of last 3 years, Audit risk +
   0 otherwise
   DEBT Debt-to-equity ratio Audit risk +
   OPINION 1 if auditor issues a less than unqualifed opinion Audit risk +
   for the client for year of study, 0 otherwise
   MNE Two different measures used: Degree of multinationality
   1.  Number of foreign subsidiaries divided by    of audit client +
        total number of subsidiaries of client
   2.  Foreign sales divided by total sales of client +
Test variables
   AUDITOR 1 for Big 6 auditors, 0 otherwise Audit firm type + or none
   MNE*AUDITOR MNE variable times AUDITOR dummy variable Interaction of MNE and auditor +
   DEVELOPSUB Number of developed countries with client subsidiaries Level of involvment of client +
   divided by total number of countries with client subsidiaries    in developed countries
   AUDITOR*DEVELOPSUB AUDITOR dummy variable times DEVELOPSUB variable Interaction of auditor and +
   DEVELOPSUB
*Natural log transformation is necessary to satisfy regression assumptions (consistent with Simon et al. 1992, Palmrose 1986)
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 Hypotheses 3 and 4 investigate the relationship between the location of the subsidiaries of MNEs and audit 
fees.  Different MNE clients may provide different levels of competitive advantage for the Big 6 firms.  For 
Hypotheses 3 and 4, samples containing only MNE clients will be examined.  The question of interest is whether Big 
6 auditors charge higher fee premiums for MNE clients with subsidiaries in developed countries than for clients with 
subsidiaries in developing countries. The following model is used to test the above hypotheses for each country 
individually. 
Model 2 (for a reduced sample) 
 
LnAUDIT FEES = b0 + b1 LnASSETS  + b2 SUBS + b3 INVREC + b4 LOSS + b5 DEBT + b6 OPINION + b7 




Predicted result for DEVELOPSUB by AUDITOR Interaction 
 















 The variable DEVELOPSUB is calculated by dividing the number of developed countries that the client has 
subsidiaries in by the total number of countries of operation.  The variable of interest for Hypotheses 3 and 4 is the 
interaction variable, AUDITOR by DEVELOPSUB, for which a positive significant coefficient is predicted.  A 
positive coefficient for the interaction variable would imply that the Big 6 auditors require a greater increase in fees 
than non-Big 6 auditors for clients that have more subsidiaries in developed countries.  This relationship is illustrated 
in Figure 1. 
 
The following sources were used to collect the data for this study: Disclosure Select Worldscope database, 
Moody‟s Companies International database, and the 1997 Directory of Corporate Affiliations - International Public 
and Private Companies.  Financial statement data, for the year 1996, was collected from Disclosure Select 
Worldscope.  Audit fees are required financial statement disclosures for all regions included in the study.  Subsidiary 
data, including location and number of subsidiaries, was collected from the Moody‟s database and the Directory of 
Corporate Affiliations.  As in prior studies, companies in regulated industries, such as banks, financial institutions, and 
utility companies, were eliminated from initial samples (see e.g., Rose 1999, Francis and Stokes 1986).  The resultant 
sample sizes are 224 companies for Malaysia, 280 companies for Hong Kong, and 917 companies for the United 
Kingdom. 
 




Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the sample data for each country.  These statistics allow for 
some preliminary analysis and comparisons of the regions. The percentage of the sample firms audited by the Big 6 in 
each country is 71% for Malaysia, 84% for Hong Kong, and 83% for the UK.  There is enough variation in auditor 
classification for the analyses of differences in auditor fees for Big 6 versus non-Big 6 auditors to be meaningful.  It is 
also noteworthy to observe the number of multinational clients in each country.  The table presents a count of firms in 
each sample that have at least one foreign subsidiary. The percentage of multinational firms to total firms in each 
sample is 50% for Malaysia, 94% for Hong Kong, and 58% for the UK.   
 
Rose (1999) reported the percentage of multinational firms for Hong Kong (65%) and Malaysia (24%), but 
focused on foreign sales disclosures.  The differences in the percentages are most likely due to the difference between 
these two measures of multinationality.  Firms that have foreign sales are not necessarily involved in foreign direct 
investment.  Also, firms with foreign subsidiaries may not have any foreign sales.  Foreign subsidiaries may perform 
many functions other than sales, including purchasing, excavation of raw materials, production, finishing, or service.  
This study uses both measures of multinationality (number of foreign subsidiaries and foreign sales). Using more than 
one measure of multinationality provides some assurance that the results are consistent and robust. 
 
The mean number of subsidiaries for the three samples is 22.86 for Malaysia, 29.13 for Hong Kong, and 
13.82 for the UK.  Malaysian companies are almost as large as those in Hong Kong.  This is quite different from the 
results presented by Simon et al. (1992).  Using a sample for the years 1987-1988, Simon et al. reported 24.2 as the 
mean number of subsidiaries for Hong Kong and 12.6 as the mean number of subsidiaries for Malaysia.  The current 




The results for the Base Model and Model 1 for Malaysia are shown in Table 3.  Table 3 includes two sets of 
results, one set for the foreign subsidiaries measure of multinationality (Test 1) and the other set for the foreign sales 
measure of multinationality (Test 2). Panel A of Table 3 presents the regression results for the Base Model: the model 
designed to test for an overall Big 6 audit fee premium in Malaysia.
8
  When using the foreign subsidiaries to total 
subsidiaries measure (Test 1), the model is significant (p<.0001) with an R
2 
of 71.3%.  The control variables for total 
assets, total subsidiaries, and level of multinationality are positive and statistically significant at the .01 level.
9
  The 
percentage of assets in inventories and receivables is also positive and significant at the .025 level. The AUDITOR 
variable is significant at the .05 level, suggesting that Big 6 firms charge fee premiums across all clients in Malaysia.  
The environment in Malaysia has apparently changed substantially since prior studies were conducted.  This is not 
surprising, as Malaysia is considered one of the fastest growing capital markets, and is currently placed in the upper-
middle income classification by the World Bank.  However, the Base Model was also run on only non-multinational 
clients, and no evidence was found to support the existence of a Big 6 fee premium for the non-multinational market 
segment.
10
  In Malaysia, multinationality of the audit client plays a critical role in audit pricing by the Big 6 firms. 
 
 Hypothesis 1 predicts that, in developing countries like Malaysia, Big 6 auditor fee premium will increase 
with the level of multinationality of the client.  Panel B of Table 3 reports the regression results for a model that 
includes the interaction of multinationality with auditor type (Model 1).  The R
2 
for the model with the first MNE 
variable (foreign subsidiaries to total subsidiaries, Test 1) is equal to 71.9%.  The incremental R
2
 procedure is used in 
order to test for the significance of the interaction term.  The t-statistic for the coefficient on the interaction term may 
not be a reliable test for significance because the t-statistic can be influenced by model specification.  The incremental 
R
2
 procedure uses an F-statistic that is not corrupted by model specification.   
 
                                                          
8 All regression models used in this study were tested for satisfaction of the regression assumptions.  Normal probability plots indicate that no 
models violated the assumption of normality.  Further, multicollinearity was not a significant problem.  No variance inflation factor in any of the 
models exceeded 2.50.   
9 The one-tail test is used for all analyses. 
10 Results not reported. 








Comparison of the R
2
 for the full model (Panel B, Test 1 of Table 3) and reduced model (Panel A, Test 1 of 
Table 3) yields an F value of 4.59.
11
  The MNE*AUDITOR interaction term is statistically significant (p<.05) and in 
the predicted positive direction.  The result provides support for Hypothesis 1.  Big 6 firms are able to charge higher 
fee premiums than domestic firms for MNE clients.  The multinational segment of the audit market in Malaysia 
provides a source of competitive advantage for the Big 6 firms.  The combination of their resources/skills and 
location-specific advantages allows Big 6 firms to charge above market prices for this market segment.  The result is 





                                                          
11 The Base Model is the “reduced model” because it does not include the interaction term.  Model 1 is the “full model” because the interaction term 
is included. 
Malaysia (currency = Ringgit )
Variable N Mean Deviation Minimum Maximum
FEE 224 227 277 14.00 2,163.00
ASSETS 224 1,406,764 2,912,180 34,335.00 32,000,000.00
SUBS 224 21.86 30.22 1.00 301.00
INVREC 224 0.35 0.20 0.00 0.89
DEBT 224 0.76 0.81 0.001 4.84
Number of firms audited by Big 6 159
Number of multinational firms 113
Hong Kong (currency = Hong Kong dollar)
Variable N Mean Deviation Minimum Maximum
FEE 280 2,918 6,397 120.00 88,893.00
ASSETS 280 13,000,000 34,278,116 45,888.00 390,000,000.00
SUBS 280 29.13 26.48 0.00 260.00
INVREC 280 0.28 0.21 0.00 0.84
DEBT 280 0.70 2.15 0.00 25.93
Number of firms audited by Big 6 234
Number of multinational firms 264
United Kingdom (currency = UK dollar)
Variable N Mean Deviation Minimum Maximum
FEE 917 577 1,486 7.00 20,000.00
ASSETS 917 535,590 2,072,714 713.00 33,000,000.00
SUBS 917 13.82 16.73 0.00 174.00
INVREC 917 0.43 0.23 0.00 1.00
DEBT 917 1.01 4.84 0.0001 93.50
Number of firms audited by Big 6 758
Number of multinational firms 530
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TABLE 3 




The importance of the results described above is certainly dependent on the acceptance of the measure of 
multinationality.  In Test 1, the ratio of foreign to total subsidiaries was used to capture the level of multinationality of 
the sample firms.  In order to validate this measure of multinationality, Hypothesis 1 was tested using the other 
measure of multinationality described in the existing literature. 
 
The ratio of foreign sales to total sales has been used to capture the level of multinationality in a number of 
studies (see e.g., Sullivan 1994, Grant 1987).  The problem with this measure is the fact that companies can make 
foreign sales without having foreign operations and vice versa.  The analyses conducted using foreign sales to total 
sales are presented in Table 3 (Test 2).  Again, the incremental R
2
 procedure is used to test for the significance of the 
interaction.  Panel A presents the reduced model with no interaction term.  The model is statistically significant 
(p<.0001) and the R
2
 is 69.3%.  The AUDITOR variable is significant at the .025 level.  Panel B displays the results 
for a model that includes the interaction of auditor and the ratio of foreign to total sales.  The model R
2
 is 70.4%.  The 
interaction term is positive and statistically significant (F=7.99, p<.01).  The results are the same as those found using 
the ratio of foreign subsidiaries to total subsidiaries and support the use of subsidiary data to measure multinationality.   
PANEL A Test 1 Test 2
Base Model - reduced model MNE Variable = MNE Variable = 
n=224 Foreign Subs./Total Subs. Foreign Sales/Total Sales
Dependent Independent Regression t-statistic Regression t-statistic
Variable Variables Coefficient Coefficient
LnFEE INTERCEPT -0.691 -1.364 -1.225 -2.357***
LnASSETS 0.375 9.990*** 0.420 10.946***
SUBS 0.011 7.312*** 0.012 8.172***
INVREC 0.422 2.119** 0.476 2.316**
LOSS -0.223 -1.206 -0.146 -0.768
DEBT 0.00007 -0.150 -0.0004 -0.731
OPINION 0.311 0.807 0.268 0.674
MNE 1.371 6.029*** 0.014 4.511***
AUDITOR 0.154 1.943* 0.180 2.211**
R-square = .713 R-square = .693
PANEL B Test 1 Test 2
Model 1 - full model MNE Variable = MNE Variable = 
n=224 Foreign Subs./Total Subs. Foreign Sales/Total Sales
Dependent Independent Regression t-statistic Regression t-statistic
Variable Variables Coefficient Coefficient
LnFEE INTERCEPT -0.708 -1.410 -1.183 -2.310**
LnASSETS 0.384 10.270*** 0.419 11.085***
SUBS 0.010 7.018*** 0.012 8.076***
INVREC 0.436 2.209** 0.516 2.545***
LOSS -0.215 -1.171 -0.178 -0.948
DEBT 0.0002 -0.333 -0.0003 -0.630
OPINION 0.271 0.709 0.270 0.691
MNE 0.269 0.501 -0.003 -0.422
AUDITOR 0.032 0.338 0.127 1.539
AUDITOR*MNE 1.311 2.259** 0.021 2.802***
R-square = .719 R-square = .704
Incremental R
2
 procedure (F test): AUDITOR*MNE variable is significant at the .05 level (Test 1), .01 level (Test 2)
Significant at * α = .05,  ** α = .025,  *** α = .01 (one-tailed test)
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Hypothesis 3 relates to the composition of the foreign subsidiaries of client firms headquartered in Malaysia.  
The hypothesis predicts that the magnitude of the audit fee premium charged by Big 6 firms will increase as client 
firms have a greater proportion of their foreign subsidiaries in developed versus developing countries.  To test this 
hypothesis, a regression model that includes two additional variables is run on a sample of multinational clients.  The 
added variables are DEVELOPSUB, (the ratio of the number of developed countries of operation to the total number 
of countries of operation) and the interaction term, DEVELOPSUB by AUDITOR.  Panels A and B of Table 4 display 
the results for the full and reduced regression models that test for the significance of the interaction between 
DEVELOPSUB and auditor type (Model 2).  The interaction term is positive and significant (F=12.46, p<.001).  




Malaysia – Model 2 
 
 
PANEL A: reduced model (n=113; only MNE clients included)
Dependent Independent Regression t-statistic
Variable Variables Coefficient











Significant at * α = .05,  ** α = .025,  *** α = .01 (one-tailed test)
PANEL B: Model 2 - full model (n=113; only MNE clients included))
Dependent Independent Regression t-statistic
Variable Variables Coefficient












Significant at * α = .05,  ** α = .025,  *** α = .01 (one-tailed test)
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The interpretation of the positive and significant coefficient for the interaction variable deserves further 
discussion.  Figure 2 presents graphically the interaction between AUDITOR and DEVELOPSUB, based on the 
regression coefficients found in Table 4 (Panel B).
12
  Indeed, the Big 6 audit fee premium increases for clients that 
have more subsidiaries in developed countries.  In fact, non-Big 6 firms actually decrease their fees for multinational 
clients that have a large proportion of their subsidiaries in developed countries.   Non-Big 6 auditors must not have a 
competitive advantage in this market and, therefore, lower their price for the audits.  Big-6 firms are quite familiar 
with reporting standards and operations in developed countries, and can deliver a differentiated (higher priced) audit 
to its clients.  Furthermore, Big-6 auditors are potentially exposed to additional risks of reputation loss (from audit 
failures) introduced by the existence of developed-country subsidiaries of the client.  The above results indicate that, 
in the Malaysian market, the location of operations of audit clients is an important consideration in determining the 









The results of a regression model that tests for the existence of a Big 6 fee premium are presented in Panel A 
of Table 5 (Base Model for Hong Kong).  The MNE variable used for this regression is the ratio of foreign to total 
subsidiaries (Test 1).  The model explains 62.4% of the variation in audit fees.  The control variables, LnASSETS, 
SUBS, INVREC, LOSS and MNE, are significant at the .01 level.  The DEBT variable is significant at the .025 level.  
As predicted, all of these control variables are positively related to audit fees.  The AUDITOR variable is positive and 
significant at the .01 level.  This result confirms the existence of a Big 6 auditor fee premium in Hong Kong.   
 
                                                          
12 As additional analysis for Malaysia, the sample of multinational clients was split based on Big 6 versus non-Big 6 auditors, and separate 
regressions were performed.  The results indicate that, for the sample that included MNE clients with non-Big 6 auditors, the coefficient for the 
DEVELOPSUB variable was negative and significant at the .01 level (one-tailed test, t-statistic = -2.828).  For the sample including MNE clients 










Big 6 auditor 
(slope=0.275)
Non-Big 6 auditor 
(slope = - 0.878)
DEVELOPSUB by AUDITOR Interaction
Low High
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Hypothesis 2 predicts that in developed countries such as Hong Kong, the magnitude of a Big 6 auditor fee 
premium will increase with increased levels of multinationality of the audit client.  Panels A and B of Table 5 present 
the test results for this hypothesis.  The model in Panel B (Model 1, Test 1) includes the interaction variable, 
AUDITOR*MNE, where MNE is calculated as the ratio of foreign to total subsidiaries.  The coefficient on the 
AUDITOR*MNE variable is not statistically significant (based on both the t-test and the F-test).  These results do not 
support Hypothesis 2.  It appears that Big 6 audit fee premiums do not increase as the client‟s ratio of foreign to total 
subsidiaries increases.  The significant results for the MNE variable reveal that auditors, in general, charge higher fees 
for multinational clients.  However, the Big 6 firms do not appear to charge additional premiums for larger 
multinationals. 
 
To validate the above findings, analysis was conducted using an alternative measure of multinationality.  
Panel A of Table 5 (Test 2) presents results for a regression model using foreign sales to total sales as a measure of 
multinationality.  This regression model is used to test for the existence of an overall Big 6 fee premium in Hong 
Kong (Base Model).  The results support the findings documented for the foreign subsidiaries to total subsidiaries 
measure.  To test for the interactive effects of auditor type and multinationality on audit fees, the interaction of 




Hong Kong – Base Model and Model 1 
 
PANEL A Test 1 Test 2
Base Model - reduced model MNE Variable = MNE Variable = 
n=280 Foreign Subs./Total Subs. Foreign Sales/Total Sales
Dependent Independent Regression t-statistic Regression t-statistic
Variable Variables Coefficient Coefficient
LnFEE INTERCEPT -0.087 -0.185 0.054 0.117
LnASSETS 0.422 14.311*** 0.423 14.338***
SUBS 0.008 5.642*** 0.008 5.514***
INVREC 0.908 4.976*** 0.946 5.226***
LOSS 0.351 3.821*** 0.317 3.455***
DEBT 0.0003 2.117** 0.0003 1.968*
OPINION -0.210 -0.723 -0.141 -0.487
MNE 0.685 4.932*** 0.005 4.982***
AUDITOR 0.444 4.932*** 0.465 5.191***
R-square = .624 R-square = .625
PANEL B Test 1 Test 2
Model 1 - full model MNE Variable = MNE Variable = 
n=280 Foreign Subs./Total Subs. Foreign Sales/Total Sales
Dependent Independent Regression t-statistic Regression t-statistic
Variable Variables Coefficient Coefficient
LnFEE INTERCEPT -0.126 -0.262 -0.006 -0.013
LnASSETS 0.421 14.190*** 0.422 14.329***
SUBS 0.008 5.646*** 0.008 5.586***
INVREC 0.909 4.972*** 0.957 5.281***
LOSS 0.348 3.766*** 0.311 3.385***
DEBT 0.0003 2.105** 0.0003 1.971**
OPINION -0.207 -0.712 -0.141 -0.485
MNE 0.833 2.225** 0.008 2.933***
AUDITOR 0.509 2.868*** 0.539 4.878***
AUDITOR*MNE -0.172 -0.426 -0.003 -1.141
R-square = .625 R-square = .627
Significant at * α = .05,  ** α = .025,  *** α = .01 (one-tailed test)
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Investigation of the composition of the foreign subsidiaries in Malaysia indicated that Big 6 firms charge 
significantly higher fees than non-Big 6 auditors for MNE clients with a greater proportion of their subsidiaries 
located in developed countries.  Hypothesis 4 predicts similar results for developed countries such as Hong Kong.  To 
test this hypothesis, a regression model was run on a sample of MNE clients.  Panels A and B of Table 6 display the 
results of full and reduced regression models designed to test for a significant interaction between AUDITOR and 
DEVELOPSUB.  The R
2
 (.643) of the full model with the interaction term is significantly higher than the R
2
 (.637) of 
the reduced model (F=4.27, p < .05).  The interaction term is significant, but negative which is opposite of the 





Hong Kong – Model 2 
 
PANEL A: reduced model (n=264; only MNE clients included)
Dependent Independent Regression t-statistic
Variable Variables Coefficient











Significant at * α = .05,  ** α = .025,  *** α = .01 (one-tailed test)
PANEL B: Model 2 - full model (n=264; only MNE clients included))
Dependent Independent Regression t-statistic
Variable Variables Coefficient












Significant at * α = .05,  ** α = .025,  *** α = .01 (one-tailed test)
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Figure 3 presents the results of the AUDITOR by DEVELOPSUB interaction term.
13
  In Hong Kong, Big 6 
audit firms do not charge increasingly higher audit fees for MNE clients with more developed country subsidiaries.  
This segment of the audit market does not seem to provide Big 6 firms additional competitive advantages.  However, 
non-Big 6 firms increase their fees for such clients.  It appears that MNE clients with operations in many developed 
countries pose significant burdens on the non-Big 6 auditors.  Non-Big 6 auditors, who are less multinational than 
their Big-6 counterparts, have less expertise outside of Hong Kong.  They must increase their audit fees because of the 










 The United Kingdom is another country classified as developed by the World Bank.  The results of a 
regression model used to test for the existence of Big 6 auditor fee premiums is found in Panel A of Table 7 (Base 
Model).  The model is significant and the coefficient on the AUDITOR variable is positive and statistically significant 
(p<.01) for both measures of multinationality (Test 1 and Test 2).  These results indicate that Big 6 auditors charge fee 
premiums in the UK.  The control variables, LnASSETS, SUBS, INVREC, LOSS, OPINION, and MNE, are all 
positive and statistically significant at the .01 level.   
 
Hypothesis 2 posits that the magnitude of a Big 6 auditor fee premium will increase with increased levels of 
multinationality of the audit client in the UK.  Panels A and B of Table 7 present the test results of reduced and full 
regression models designed to test Hypothesis 2.  Model 1 in Panel B includes the interaction of multinationality and 
                                                          
13 As additional analysis for Hong Kong, the sample of multinational clients was split based on Big 6 versus non-Big 6 auditors, and separate 
regressions were performed.  The results indicate that, for the sample that included MNE clients with non-Big 6 auditors, the coefficient for the 
DEVELOPSUB variable was positive and significant at the .025 level (one-tailed test, t-statistic = 2.325).  For the sample including MNE clients 











Big 6 auditor 
(slope= -0.060)
Non-Big 6 auditor 
(slope = 0.734)
DEVELOPSUB by AUDITOR Interaction
Low High
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auditor for both measures of multinationality (Test 1 and Test 2).  Similar to the results for Hong Kong, the 
coefficients on the interaction terms are not statistically significant.  These results fail to support Hypothesis 2 for the 
United Kingdom.  The level of multinationality of the client increases fees for all audit firms in the UK, but 
multinationality does not increase fees more for Big 6 firms than for non-Big 6 firms.  As mentioned previously, the 
United Kingdom is a highly developed G7 nation.  It appears that multinational client firms do not provide Big 6 firms 
additional competitive advantages.   
 
In Hong Kong, there was a significant interaction between DEVELOPSUB and AUDITOR.  The next test 
investigates whether the same relationship exists in the UK.  Hypothesis 4 states that audit fee premiums will increase 
for client firms with a greater proportion of subsidiaries located in developed countries relative to subsidiaries located 
in developing countries.  Regression results are presented in Panels A and B of Table 8 (Model 2).  In the UK, there is 
no statistically significant DEVELOPSUB*AUDITOR interaction.  For clients headquartered in the UK, the location 
of foreign subsidiaries in other developed countries does not appear to provide any additional competitive advantages.  
This result differs from the result found for the other developed country, Hong Kong.  Non-Big 6 auditors in Hong 
Kong increased their fees for clients with more subsidiaries in developed countries.  This result in not confirmed in the 





United Kingdom – Base Model and Model 1 
 
PANEL A Test 1 Test 2
Base Model - reduced model MNE Variable = MNE Variable = 
n=917 Foreign Subs./Total Subs. Foreign Sales/Total Sales
Dependent Independent Regression t-statistic Regression t-statistic
Variable Variables Coefficient Coefficient
LnFEE INTERCEPT -1.747 -9.356*** -1.643 -8.862***
LnASSETS 0.548 34.255*** 0.543 34.263***
SUBS 0.011 7.366*** 0.010 6.793***
INVREC 0.587 6.026*** 0.583 6.056***
LOSS 0.267 5.378*** 0.247 5.039***
DEBT 0.00003 0.606 0.000007 0.175
OPINION 0.179 0.895 0.138 0.696
MNE 0.690 8.900*** 0.009 10.126***
AUDITOR 0.173 3.025*** 0.163 2.874***
R-square = .761 R-square = .767
PANEL B Test 1 Test 2
Model 1 - full model MNE Variable = MNE Variable = 
n=917 Foreign Subs./Total Subs. Foreign Sales/Total Sales
Dependent Independent Regression t-statistic Regression t-statistic
Variable Variables Coefficient Coefficient
LnFEE INTERCEPT -1.740 -9.199*** -1.629 -8.708***
LnASSETS 0.548 34.237*** 0.543 34.249***
SUBS 0.011 7.330*** 0.010 6.739***
INVREC 0.588 6.026*** 0.585 6.075***
LOSS 0.267 5.378*** 0.247 5.020**
DEBT 0.00003 0.604 0.000007 0.167
OPINION 0.180 0.898 0.141 0.711
MNE 0.651 3.283*** 0.007 2.706***
AUDITOR 0.165 2.363*** 0.145 2.273**
AUDITOR*MNE 0.045 0.213 0.002 0.592
R-square = .761 R-square = .767
Significant at * α = .05,  ** α = .025,  *** α = .01 (one-tailed test)
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
 Location-specific advantages and audit firm characteristics moderate the effect of resources and skills on the 
differentiation/cost competitive positional advantages.  For example, not all countries offer location advantages that 
would allow Big 6 firms to charge premiums.  This study argues that developing countries have certain location 
conditions that counterbalance the benefits of the competitive advantages owned by Big 6 accounting firms.  
Multinational clients, however, represent a separate market for audit services where Big 6 firms can realize their 
competitive advantages. 
 
 This research examined the effect of brand equity, as a source of competitive advantage, on Big 6 firm 
pricing in the multinational client segment of the audit market.  Three markets for audit services were analyzed, 
including markets in Malaysia, Hong Kong, and the United Kingdom.  A dual market (domestic and multinational) for 
audit services appears to exist in Malaysia.  The results indicate that audit fee premiums increase as the level of 
multinationality of the client increases.  Big 6 auditors are able to take greater advantage of their reputation and brand 
name advantages in the multinational client segment.   
 
The location of a multinational client‟s operations is also an important factor in determining the firm‟s 
competitive position.  In Malaysia, the magnitude of the Big 6 audit fee premium increases for clients with 
subsidiaries in developed countries.  As compared to non-Big 6 firms, Big 6 auditors have certain resources and skills 
that enable them to provide more desired audit services for multinational clients with developed country operations.  
The study found different results for the developed economies.  It appears that, in Hong Kong and the United 
Kingdom, the location of client subsidiaries in developed countries does not provide additional competitive 
advantages for Big 6 firms.  One explanation for this result is that client companies in Hong Kong (and the UK) are 
headquartered in a developed country where the Big 6 are not as differentiated from their non-Big 6 counterparts.  In 
Malaysia, Big 6 firms are able to provide significant additional expertise (over domestic firms) in the audits of their 
developed MNE clients. 
 
It is important to examine the issue of multinationality as a determinant of audit fees and fee premiums 
because of the growing interdependence of global markets.  An increasing number of accounting firms are expanding 
the scope of their operations to include international markets.  Firms are not only exploring the markets of developed 
countries, but they are also venturing into developing countries in Latin and South America, Asia, Africa, and Central 
and Eastern Europe.  These economies are opening their doors to foreign direct investment, and the markets for audit 
services are expanding.  Researchers must investigate how the international markets value audit services because the 
demand for audit services relates directly to the quality of financial disclosures in these markets. 
 
 Additionally, the presence of multinational enterprises may actually foster economic growth in developing 
regions.  While cultural, political and legal factors are difficult to change in order to promote economic development, 
it is possible to influence the creation and composition of multinational enterprises.  Such actions could benefit not 
only the MNEs and the developing nations, but also the global economy. 
 
The theories discussed in this study involve generalizations concerning audit markets in developed and 
developing countries.  Additional examples of countries that fall into these two categories should be investigated to 
support the general theory of auditor competitive advantages in developed and developing regions.  A valuable 
extension of the study would involve examining audit pricing for countries that fall into the four different income 
categories provided by the World Bank.  Samples could be gathered from low income countries, lower middle income 
countries, upper middle income countries, and high income countries.  Such an analysis could provide valuable 
information about competitive advantages and audit economics issues for countries at four different levels of 
economic development.  Data, however, is not readily available for the less developed countries, and alternative 
sources would have to be investigated.  Perhaps a case-study research design would be more appropriate for such 
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TABLE 8 




 An additional investigation of the Hong Kong market should be conducted after its transition to the Chinese 
rule.  The study should include data gathered four or five years after the transition year in order to allow time for the 
adjustment.  Also, the results for the UK should be compared to a new study done for the US.  The US also has a 
highly developed auditing profession and sophisticated capital markets.  The role that multinationality plays in the US 
audit market has not been documented.  A dual market for audit services was not found in the UK.  A study of the US 





PANEL A: reduced model (n=530; only MNE clients included)
Dependent Independent Regression t-statistic
Variable Variables Coefficient











Significant at * α = .05,  ** α = .025,  *** α = .01 (one-tailed test)
PANEL B: Model 2 - full model (n=530; only MNE clients included))
Dependent Independent Regression t-statistic
Variable Variables Coefficient












Significant at * α = .05,  ** α = .025,  *** α = .01 (one-tailed test)
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NOTES 
